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THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF
PROSECUTORIAL POWER
DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY*
The key to the growing prominence of prosecutors, both in the United
States and elsewhere, lies in the prosecutor’s preeminent ability to bridge
organizational and conceptual divides in criminal justice. Above all else,
prosecutors are mediating figures, straddling the frontiers between
adversarial and inquisitorial justice, between the police and the courts, and
between law and discretion. By blurring these boundaries, prosecutors
provide the criminal justice system with three different kinds of flexibility—
ideological, institutional, and operational—and they strengthen their own
hands in a legal culture that increasingly disfavors institutional rigidity and
hard-and-fast commitments. At the same time, though, the mediating role
of the prosecutor frustrates traditional strategies for holding government
accountable. The bridges that prosecutors provide—between law and
politics, rules and discretion, courts and police, advocacy and objectivity—
make curtailing prosecutorial power and taming prosecutorial discretion
trickier business than is often suggested, or at least a different kind of
business.
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INTRODUCTION
Much of what is wrong with American criminal justice—its racial
inequity, its excessive severity, its propensity for error—is increasingly
blamed on prosecutors.1 Moreover, prosecutors seem to be getting ever
more powerful, not just in the United States, but in much of the rest of the
world as well.2 The nature of prosecutorial power and the reasons for its
growth remain murky, though. As a result, it is hard to know exactly what
to make of prosecutors or what we should expect from them. There is
plenty of thoughtful, well-informed scholarship on prosecutors, especially
in the United States, but most of this work is self-consciously pragmatic. It
takes the modern prosecutor’s office as a given, a dragon that we find living
in our midst and wish to tame. My goal here is slightly different, less
immediately reformist. I want to step back and try to understand the
dragon: what kind of animal it is and why it is with us.
The haze surrounding prosecutors is both descriptive and conceptual.
On the descriptive side, we know much less about prosecutors than we do
about the other main officials in the criminal justice system: judges and the
police. Unlike judges, prosecutors generally do not announce the grounds
for their decisions—or even, often, the fact that they have made a decision.
And unlike the police, prosecutors carry out most of their work behind
closed doors. Although law enforcement remains in many ways a secretive
occupation, the bulk of patrol work is necessarily done in public, and it has
become common over the past half-century for large police departments to

1

See, e.g., John F. Pfaff, Escaping from the Standard Story: Why the Conventional
Wisdom on Prison Growth is Wrong, and Where We Can Go From Here, 26 FED. SENT’G
REP. 265 (2014) (prison growth); Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing
and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123
YALE L.J. 2, 6 (2013) (racial inequity); Editorial, 152 Innocents, Marked for Death, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2015, at A18 (wrongful convictions).
2
See, e.g., Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade, Introduction to Adversarial and
Inquisitorial Systems—Distinctive Aspects and Convergent Trends, in THE PROSECUTOR IN
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 177 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); Rachel E.
Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative
Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 874, 921 (2009); Michael Tonry, Prosecutors and Politics in
Comparative Perspective, 41 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2012).
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open themselves to outside researchers.3 As a result, we now have
qualitative, observational accounts of virtually every sort of task that police
officers carry out. We have nothing like that for prosecutors.4 At the
quantitative level, as well, we have detailed information about the
demographics of police workforces and fine-grained statistics about
investigatory stops, citations, summonses, and arrests.5 We have good data
on judges and on judicial case management, too, from bail decisions
through sentencing.6 By comparison the statistics on prosecutors and their
exercises of discretion are meager.7
If anything, the conceptual fog around prosecutors is even thicker.
Evaluating prosecutors who seek reelection is difficult not just because the
available information about how they run their offices is so limited,8 but
also because it is unclear what information we should want. Even when
what prosecutors have done is reasonably plain, it can be hard to know how
to assess it. In the second half of 2014, for example, prosecutors in
Missouri and New York failed to indict the white police officers responsible
for separate, widely publicized killings of unarmed black men. In each
case, the prosecutors said they had provided a grand jury with all of the
relevant evidence, both incriminating and exculpatory, and the grand jurors
had made their own, independent assessment that no charges were
justified.9 Modern grand juries are famously docile,10 so pinning the
3

See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., FAIRNESS AND
EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004)
[hereinafter FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING].
4
See, e.g., Tonry, supra note 2, at 25–26.
5
See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense
of the New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209 (2006);
FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING, supra note 3.
6
See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS:
AN OVERVIEW OF 2013 STATE COURT CASELOADS (2015); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2014 (2015).
7
See, e.g., KATHERINE J. BIES ET AL., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., STANFORD
LAW SCH., STUCK IN THE ‘70S: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF CALIFORNIA PROSECUTORS 7–8
(2015); John F. Pfaff, The War on Drugs and Prison Growth: Limited Importance, Limited
Legislative Options, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 177 (2015); Ronald F. Wright et al., The
Many Faces of Prosecution, 1 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 27, 32–34 (2014).
8
See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 166–67 (2007); Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86
WASH. L. REV. 69 (2011).
9
See, e.g., Rebecca Davis O’Brien, Sizing Up a Prosecutor’s Performance: Staten
Island District Attorney Gets Mixed Reviews on Handling of Grand Jury in Eric Garner
Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2014, at A20; David Zucchino, Grand Jury Move Stokes
Controversy, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2014, at A11.
10
See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the
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decision on them sounded a little like Mr. Spenlow blaming his law partner
for his own stinginess—explaining with “gentle melancholy” that “it is an
irksome incident in my professional life, that I am not at liberty to consult
my own wishes.”11 But what should the prosecutors have done? Some
critics faulted them for presenting exculpatory information to the grand
jurors: that was acting like defense attorneys, not like prosecutors.12 But
prosecutors are often attacked precisely for failing to present the evidence
to grand juries evenhandedly.13 Some observers thought the prosecutors in
the Missouri and New York cases were insufficiently responsive to their
constituents.14 Others said the prosecutors, at least in Staten Island, may
have been too responsive to their constituents.15 But how should public
opinion influence prosecutorial decisions? In what ways, if any, do we
want prosecutors to be politically accountable?
These questions are so thorny in large part because our expectations of

Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260 (1995). In 2015, California required prosecutors to
decide for themselves whether to file homicide charges against police officers; tellingly, the
California District Attorneys Association opposed the change on the ground that the “option”
of grand jury proceedings “should remain available as a tool for prosecutors.” Melody
Gutierrez, State Ends Secret Hearings in Police Killings of Civilians, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 11,
2015), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/California-eliminates-use-of-grand-juries-to6438501.php.
11
CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 473 (Nonesuch Press 1937) (1850).
12
See, e.g., Alice Ollstein & Kira Lerner, Experts Blast Ferguson Prosecutor’s Press
Conference, Legal Strategy, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 25, 2014), https://thinkprogress.org/exp
erts-blast-ferguson-prosecutors-press-conference-legal-strategy-202dfd230ad3#.i060qg575.
13
In fact, the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Standards for the
Prosecution Function, although lacking legal force, explicitly direct that “[n]o prosecutor
should knowingly fail to disclose to the grand jury evidence which tends to negate guilt or
mitigate the offense.” CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, § 33.6(b) (2015). The commentary to Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct—
the only provision of the rules directly addressing prosecutors—also used to make clear that
prosecutors should disclose exculpatory evidence to grand juries, but that language was
deleted in 2002. See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 152. The Supreme Court, for its part, has ruled
that federal prosecutors have no legal obligation to present exculpatory evidence to grand
juries. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51–54 (1992). The National District
Attorneys Association ducks the question by recommending that prosecutors disclose
exculpatory evidence to grand juries “as required by law or applicable rules of ethical
conduct.” NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 3-3.5(a) (Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n
2009).
14
See, e.g., Alex Altman, Grand Jury Process Raises Questions About a Ferguson
Indictment, TIME (Sept. 18, 2014), http://time.com/3399022/ferguson-michael-brown-darrenwilson-grand-jury/.
15
Cf. Tonry, supra note 2, at 12 (arguing against “democratic accountability” for
prosecutors, “since it seems self-evident that external considerations should be irrelevant to
decisions in individual cases”).
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prosecutors are so conflicting.16 We want them to be zealous advocates and
impartial reviewers of the facts, crime fighters and instruments of mercy,
law enforcement leaders and officers of the court, loyal public servants and
independent professionals, champions of community values and defenders
of the rule of law. We have conflicting expectations of other officials, too,
but not to the same extent. I will argue that this is actually the key to
understanding prosecutors: above all else, they are mediating figures,
bridging organizational and theoretical divides in criminal justice. The
boundary-blurring nature of prosecutorial power, I will suggest, helps to
explain its rise and is critical to thinking sensibly about its control,
reformation, or replacement.
First, though, I need to lay some groundwork. Part I of this Article
will address the perception and reality of prosecutorial power. What do
people mean when they say that prosecutors are the most influential actors
in the criminal justice system and are growing increasingly more powerful,
and what evidence supports these claims? Part I will also examine the
extent to which prosecutorial power is a distinctly American phenomenon
or a worldwide trend. Two or three decades ago it was conventional
wisdom that prosecutors in the United States had no parallels overseas,17
and even today it is common to stress the uniqueness of the American
prosecutor.18 But there is also a growing literature suggesting that
prosecutorial power is on the rise elsewhere in the world, especially in
Europe.19 So how exceptional is the United States in this regard? Finally,
Part I will assess and ultimately reject a common, two-part explanation for
the rise of prosecutorial power: burgeoning caseloads and the growth of
plea bargaining. The story is that as criminal caseloads have ballooned, the
system has been forced to forego trials in favor of consensual settlements,
and the haggling over outcomes has made prosecutors more important and

16

They are thorny also, in part, because we have competing ideas about democracy. See
David Alan Sklansky, Unpacking the Relationship Between Prosecutors and Democracy in
the United States, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY (Máximo
Langer & David Alan Sklansky eds., forthcoming 2017).
17
See, e.g., JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY xv,
6 (1980); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States:
The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J.
1325 (1993).
18
See, e.g., John L. Worrall, Prosecution in America: A Historical and Comparative
Account, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 3, 4 (John L. Worrall & M.
Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008); Tonry, supra note 2.
19
See, e.g., Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1413, 1427 (2010).
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more powerful.20 The biggest problem with this explanation is the direction
of causation. It is unclear whether rising caseloads have led to more plea
bargaining, or whether plea bargaining instead has increased caseloads by
expanding the system’s capacity, the way that widening a highway can
bring more traffic.21 Nor is it clear whether prosecutorial power has been
boosted by the rise of plea bargaining, or for that matter by swelling
caseloads, as opposed to vice versa. It is not even obvious, as an initial
matter, why more criminal cases or more plea bargaining should be
expected to bolster prosecutorial power.
Part II of the Article will advance a different explanation for the
growing clout of prosecutors, rooted in a specific understanding of the
prosecutor’s role. I will argue that prosecutors are first and foremost
mediating figures. They mediate between law and discretion, between
vengeance and mercy, between the adversarial and inquisitorial systems,
and between courts and police. This mediating role is what distinguishes
prosecutors most significantly from other actors in the criminal justice
system, and it is likely why the system has come to rely on them so heavily.
Accordingly, Part III of the Article will suggest that the mediating functions
performed by prosecutors must be taken into account if we are to think
productively about curtailing the power of prosecutors, refashioning their
self-image, or altering their behavior.
One sign of our impoverished thinking about prosecutors is that the
agenda for prosecutorial reform in recent years has so often been cribbed
from police reform. “Community policing” seemed successful, so why not
“community prosecution”?22 “Intelligence-led policing” and “predictive
policing” lead to talk of “intelligence-driven prosecution”23 and “predictive
prosecution.”24 And when our aspirations for prosecutors do not echo the
20

See, e.g., id. at 1439–40; Chris Lewis, The Evolving Role of the English Crown
Prosecution Service, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 214, 219 (Erik
Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); Josef Zila, Prosecutorial Powers and Policy Making
in Sweden and the Other Nordic Countries, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 235, 249 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012).
21
See, e.g., DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY
AND LAISSEZ FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW 158–64 (2016).
22
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 305
(2011); Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1465 (2002);
Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321
(2002); Ronald F. Wright, Community Prosecution, Comparative Prosecution, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 361 (2012).
23
Chip Brown, Cyrus Vance Jr.’s ‘Moneyball’ Approach to Crime, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/magazine/cyrus-vance-jrs-moneyballapproach-to-crime.html.
24
Heather Mac Donald, Opinion, A Smarter Way to Prosecute, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10,

2. SKLANSKY

2016]

3/31/2017 2:20 PM

PROSECUTORIAL POWER

479

latest buzzwords in policing, they are often close to vacuous. Attorney
General Robert Jackson’s famous 1940 address to the United States
Attorneys asked them to rededicate themselves “to the spirit of fair play and
decency.”25 Jackson explained that “[t]he qualities of a good prosecutor are
as elusive and as impossible to define as those which mark a gentleman,”
and “those who need to be told would not understand it anyway.”26 Pretty
much the most Jackson could say was that the good prosecutor “tempers
zeal with human kindness, . . . seeks truth and not victims, . . . serves the
law and not factional purposes, and . . . approaches his task with
humility.”27 Justice Sutherland’s equally celebrated remarks five years
earlier for the Supreme Court in Berger v. United States urged prosecutors
to proceed with “earnestness and vigor”—striking “hard blows” but not
“foul ones,” forswearing “improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction” but employing “every legitimate means to bring about
a just one.”28
Jackson’s speech and Berger are hallowed texts;29 they are for
prosecutors what the Peelian Principles are for police officers.30 And like
2014, at A24.
25
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 4
(1940).
26
Id. at 6.
27
Id.
28
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Like Jackson, Justice Sutherland seemed to think that being a
good prosecutor was something like being a gentleman; he faulted the prosecutor in Berger
for conduct that was “undignified,” “intemperate,” and “thoroughly indecorous and
improper.” Id. at 84, 85.
29
For an utterly typical invocation of Berger, see Memorandum from David W. Ogden,
Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Dep’t Prosecutors, U.S. Dep’t of Justice
(Jan. 4, 2010) (declaring that “Justice Sutherland’s observations regarding the role of a
prosecutor are as true today as they were when he wrote them over 70 years ago”). Ogden
also noted, as federal prosecutors are wont to do, that an inscription outside the Attorney
General’s office declares that “[t]he United States wins its point whenever justice is done its
citizens in the courts”—echoing both Justice Sutherland’s observation in Berger that a
United States Attorney’s interest in a criminal case is simply “that justice shall be done,” 295
U.S. at 88, and Jackson’s virtually identical pronouncement that “[a]lthough the government
technically loses its case, it has really won if justice has been done,” Jackson, supra note 25,
at 4. It is worth noting the passive voice in all of these formulations, which in its own way
reflects the notion that the prosecutor’s role is to mediate within the criminal justice system.
The prosecutor’s job is not to do justice but to see that it “is done”: the prosecutor is less an
independent minister of justice than a kind of systemic lubricant or catalyst.
30
Regarding the principles of policing attributed (probably in error) to Sir Robert Peel,
see generally Susan A. Lentz & Robert H. Chaires, The Invention of Peel’s Principles: A
Study of Policing ‘Textbook’ History, 35 J. CRIM. JUST. 69 (2007). The Peelian Principles,
which famously declare that “the police are the public and the public are the police” and
counsel the police to “secure the willing cooperation of the public” without “catering to the
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the Peelian Principles they serve too often as a substitute for thought. With
some justification, Ian Loader faults the Peelian Principles not only for
saying too little but also for lacking legal force.31 They are paragons of
specificity, though, compared with “fair play,” “decency,” and striking
“hard blows” but not “foul ones.” (Jackson’s speech actually had a bit
more content than that, but the content, as we will see, is usually
disregarded in favor of the bromides.32) Furthermore, while the Peelian
Principles themselves do not have constitutional stature, they are
supplemented both in Britain and in the United States with systems of
restraints on the exercise of police discretion far more extensive than
anything either country has developed for prosecutors33—restraints that
themselves reflect, particularly in the United States, nuanced if not always
consistent ideas about the role of the police in a democratic society.34 We
have nothing like that for prosecutors, and the absence of coherent
aspirations may go a long way toward explaining the dearth of meaningful
rules.
I. POWER
The starting point for virtually every discussion of prosecutors in the
United States is their tremendous clout. “The American prosecutor rules
the criminal justice system,”35 exercising “almost limitless discretion”36
public opinion,” see, e.g., William J. Bratton, Sir Robert Peel’s Nine Principles of Policing,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/nyregion/sir-robert-peelsnine-principles-of-policing.html, have become “central to the self-understanding of AngloAmerican policing.” Ian Loader, Recasting Civic Policing: Beyond “Peelian” Principles, in
The Future of Criminal Law: Working Papers from the 2014 Annual Conference of the
Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 1, 1 (Michelle Madden Dempsey et al
eds., 2014). Former New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton, for example,
singled out the Peelian Principles as the foundational text of modern law enforcement, “as
relevant and meaningful today as they were in the 1830s.” William Bratton, Peel’s Nine
Principles of Policing, COMMISSIONER’S CORNER (Mar. 6, 2014) (on file with author).
31
Loader, supra note 30, at 1.
32
See infra text accompanying note 62.
33
Regarding the possibility, minimally realized, that prosecutors in the United States
might be regulated by professional rules and standards, see supra note 13; infra notes 161 &
233, and accompanying text.
34
See generally DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE (2008).
35
Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade, Preface to THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE xi, xi (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012).
36
Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade, supra note 19, at 1414–15; cf., e.g., Rachel E.
Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1049 (2006)
(describing the “almost unbridled discretion” of prosecutors to “make all the key judgments”
in criminal cases); STUNTZ, supra note 22, at 87 (stressing the “enormous discretionary
power” of prosecutors in the United States).
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and “virtually absolute power.”37 The concentration of power in the hands
of prosecutors has been called the “overriding evil” of American criminal
justice38—which is saying something, given the range and magnitude of the
system’s problems. Nor is this a new concern. Since at least the early
twentieth century, “[t]he immense authority of the public prosecutor over
criminal justice has been a universally recognized feature of American
criminal prosecution . . . .”39 Robert Jackson took it as obvious in 1940 that
“[t]he prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any
other person in America.”40 Since then, prosecutors in the United States are
widely thought to have grown significantly more powerful,41 and
prosecutors elsewhere may be catching up. There are reports, in particular,
that “the European prosecutor is beginning to look like his American
counterpart, with the de facto and sometimes de jure authority to adjudicate
cases.”42 In Europe, as in the United States, prosecutors are now said to
“loom[] over [judges] both in power and importance.”43 Before turning to

37
Marc L. Miller, Domination and Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 1211, 1252 (2004); see also, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus
Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960–61 (2009); Erik Luna, Prosecutor
King, 1 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 48, 57–70 (2014); Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine,
The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (2014); DAVIS,
supra note 8, at 3–5; Barkow, supra note 2, at 874–75.
38
Donald A. Dripps, Reinventing Plea Bargaining, in The Future of Criminal Law:
Working Papers from the 2014 Annual Conference of the Robina Institute of Criminal Law
and Criminal Justice, supra note 30, at 55, 60; see also Barkow, supra note 2, at 871; Luna,
supra note 37, at 102.
39
Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal
Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568,
568 (1984); see also, e.g., Newman F. Baker, The Prosecutor—Initiation of Prosecution, 23
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 770, 796 (1933) (arguing that the prosecutor’s discretionary
charging decisions effectively constitute “the ‘law’ to the ordinary man”); Pizzi, supra note
17, at 1336 (observing that the “premise from which all proposals to reform the American
prosecutor seem to begin” is concern that essentially limitless charging discretion makes
American prosecutors “nearly omnipotent”).
40
Jackson, supra note 25, at 25.
41
See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 210–30 (2003); William T. Pizzi, A Perfect Storm: Prosecutorial
Discretion in the United States, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 189,
190 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); Wesley M. Oliver, Charles Lindbergh,
Caryl Chessman, and the Exception Proving the (Potentially Waning) Rule of Broad
Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 9 (2015); James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1573 (1981).
42
Luna, supra note 37, at 67.
43
Stephen C. Thaman, The Penal Order: Prosecutorial Sentencing as a Model for
Criminal Justice Reform?, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 156, 156
(Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012).
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the common explanations for these developments, it is worth taking a closer
look at the nature of the power that prosecutors exercise, as well as the
degree to which the American prosecutor remains unique from a global
perspective.
A. DESCRIBING AND MEASURING PROSECUTORIAL POWER

Discussions of prosecutorial power almost always proceed on the
unstated assumption that we know what “power” means in this context and
how to assess it. But power is a notoriously “elusive concept”44; there is a
long, unsettled debate among social scientists about how best to define it.45
So what kind of power is it that American prosecutors seem to have so
much of?
Social scientists commonly understand power either in terms of
influence—controlling the actions that other people take—or in terms of
outcomes—controlling what happens to other people. Thus, power can be
understood as the ability to “get [someone else] to do something he [or she]
would not otherwise do,”46 or alternatively as the ability to “modify others’
states by providing or withholding resources or administering
punishments.”47 Under either view, power is relational, defined in part by
its subjects: “one cannot say that someone has power without specifying

44

KEITH M. DOWDING, RATIONAL CHOICE AND POLITICAL POWER 1 (1991); see also
STEWART R. CLEGG, FRAMEWORKS OF POWER xv (1989) (calling power the “most ‘contested’
of concepts”); DENNIS H. WRONG, POWER: ITS FORMS, BASES, AND USES vii–ix, xxvii (1995)
(surveying the “conflations and ambiguities” plaguing the “elusive” concept of power); John
C. Turner, Explaining the Nature of Power: A Three-Process Theory, 35 EUR. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1, 5 (2005) (observing that the definition of power “has long been a murky
business”).
45
See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske & Jennifer Berdahl, Social Power, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:
HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 678, 678 (Arie W. Kruglanski & E. Tory Higgins eds., 2d
ed. 2007); Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201, 201 (1957); Dacher
Keltner et al., Power, Approach, and Inhibition, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 265, 265 (2003);
DOWDING, supra note 44, at 3–16; WRONG, supra note 44, at 2.
46
Dahl, supra note 45, at 204; see also, John R. P. French, Jr. & Bertram Raven, The
Bases of Social Power, in STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER 150, 150 (Dorwin Cartwright ed.,
1959).
47
Keltner et al., supra note 45, at 265; see also Dorwin Cartwright, A Field Theoretical
Conception of Power, in STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER, supra note 46, at 183, 193; WRONG,
supra note 44, at 2, 21; Ezra Stotland, Peer Groups and Reactions to Power Figures, in
STUDIES IN SOCIAL POWER, supra note 46, at 53, 54; Fiske & Berdahl, supra note 45, at 679.
Wrong draws a useful distinction between “power over” (by which he means the ability to
get other people to do things) and “power to” (by which he means, roughly, the ability to
change outcomes); he argues that the former is simply a special case of the latter,
distinguished by the motive of the power wielder. See WRONG, supra note 44, at 220–21.
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over whom.”48 And under either view power is further demarcated,
typically, by its scope and its magnitude—that is to say, by the range of
actions or outcomes it controls, and by how completely it controls those
things.49
Prosecutorial power is most naturally defined in terms of outcomes,
but it also can be understood—and sometimes may need to be understood—
as a matter of influence. The power of prosecutors, Jackson said, resides in
their “control over life, liberty, and reputation.”50 He explained that the
prosecutor:
can have citizens investigated and, if he is that kind of person, he can have this done
to the tune of public statements and veiled or unveiled intimations. . . . The
prosecutor can order arrests, present cases to the grand jury in secret session, and on
the basis of his one-sided presentation of the facts, can cause the citizen to be indicted
and held for trial. He may dismiss the case before trial, in which case the defense
never has a chance to be heard. Or he may go on with a public trial. If he obtains a
conviction, the prosecutor can still make recommendations as to sentence, as to
whether the prisoner should get probation or a suspended sentence, and after he is put
51
away, as to whether he is a fit subject for parole.

This is the way prosecutorial power is usually described. It is the power to
wreck lives, to put people on trial, and to lock them up—in short, to create
dire outcomes.52 But even in Jackson’s canonical account, the prosecutor’s
power depends in part on an ability to “make recommendations” that
others—judges and parole boards—then follow.53 And when you think
about it, pretty much everything a prosecutor does is done through others.
The prosecutor gets law enforcement officers to investigate, magistrates to
issue warrants, grand juries to indict, defendants to plead guilty (or, if
necessary, trial juries to convict), and judges to imprison. Little of this is
done by actually ordering anyone to do anything; almost all of it is
influence.54 We might say that the power of prosecutors is the ability to
cause outcomes through influence.55
48

Fiske & Berdahl, supra note 45, at 680; see also WRONG, supra note 44, at xxi; Dahl,
supra note 45, at 206.
49
See Dahl, supra note 45, at 203, 205–06.
50
Jackson, supra note 25, at 3.
51
Id.
52
See, e.g., Luna, supra note 34, at 57–60.
53
Jackson, supra note 25, at 3.
54
See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003).
55
In this respect, prosecutorial power exemplifies what Dowding calls “social power”—
“the ability of an actor deliberately to change the incentive structure of another actor or
actors to bring about, or help bring about outcomes.” DOWDING, supra note 44, at 48.
Dowding distinguishes social power from “outcome power,” which does not necessarily
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Much of the prosecutor’s influence depends, in turn, on an ability to
threaten outcomes; this is notably true in the context of plea bargaining, and
it is true as well when prosecutors agree to forego charges against
organizations in exchange for commitments for institutional reform and
self-monitoring—arrangements commonly called “non-prosecution
agreements” or “deferred prosecution agreements.”56 But some of the
prosecutors’ influence stems less from their ability to make threats or
promises than from their air of authority and their ongoing relationships
with judges, probation officers, law enforcement agents, and legislators.57
What can be said about the subjects, the scope, and the magnitude of
prosecutorial power? Set aside magnitude for the moment; we will return
to it shortly. The subjects of prosecutorial power are criminal defendants
and potential criminal defendants, and the scope, traditionally, has been
limited to the results of criminal cases. Prosecutors have no greater ability
than anyone else to hail a cab during rush hour or to get Congress to create
a new national park. Obviously, though, criminal cases are important, so
even powers exercised only in this context are worth worrying about. And
the restrictions on the subjects and scope of prosecutorial power have
significantly loosened over the past several decades.
The most important development in this regard probably has not been
the expanding scope of criminal prohibitions in the United States, despite
the widespread concern that “overcriminalization” has made a larger and
larger range of conduct potentially the subject of a criminal prosecution.58
The scope of prosecutorial power plainly has been increased by some
expansions in the range of criminalization: the treatment of immigration

require a social relationship; outcome power is simply “the ability of an actor to bring about
or help to bring about outcomes.” Id. Social power, as Dowding defines it, is part of what
Turner calls the “standard theory of power” in the social sciences—a theory that defines
power as “the capacity to influence other people” through “the control of resources (positive
and negative outcomes, rewards and costs, information, etc.) that are desired, valued or
needed by others.” Turner, supra note 44, at 2.
56
See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853
(2007).
57
See, e.g., Richman, supra note 54, at 755–94. In this respect prosecutors may provide
support for recent suggestions by some social scientists that power should be understood as
having less to do with “dependence relationships” than with group dynamics and “the basis
of organized, collective action.” Turner, supra note 44, at 2; see also JOHN KENNETH
GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER 4–6 (1983) (distinguishing “condign power,” based
on threats, from “compensatory power,” based on rewards, and “conditioned power,” which
is “exercised through changing belief” by “education, or . . . social commitment”).
58
See, e.g., Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 785, 793–95 (2012).
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violations as criminal offenses is a good example.59 But it is not clear, on
the whole, that criminal prohibitions reach further today than in the past.
Many things that did not used to be crimes now are, but the converse is true
as well: there are also lots of things that used be crimes—adultery, sodomy,
loitering, buying and selling alcohol—that are not anymore.60
What do seem to have changed, though, are public and professional
attitudes about using the criminal law as a lever to reach conduct that might
not itself be criminally punishable. There is growing comfort with, and
even enthusiasm for, what used to be called “pretextual prosecutions”:
criminal cases in which the offense charged is just an expedient way to
convict, lock up, or exert leverage over a defendant targeted for other
reasons.61 In his speech to the United States Attorneys, Robert Jackson
located “the most dangerous power of the prosecutor” in the ability to pick
defendants instead of picking cases:
With the law books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair
chance of finding at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost
anyone. In such a case, it is not a question of discovering the commission of a crime
and then looking for the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man
and then searching the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin some
62
offense on him.

Part of Jackson’s worry was that prosecutions of this kind could easily
become “personal.”63 The “real crime” might simply be that the defendant
was “unpopular with the predominant or governing group,” had “the wrong
political views,” or was “personally obnoxious to or in the way of the
prosecutor.”64 But his warning plainly reflected a broader discomfort with
giving prosecutors the authority to determine who deserved punishment, for
whatever reason, as long as they could rummage around and find a charge
to file. The unease was captured in the once widespread intuition that there
59

See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 194–96 (2012).
60
See generally Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV.
223 (2007). Reviewing the long history of legislatures “repealing or narrowing criminal
statutes, reducing offense severity, and converting low-level crimes to civil infractions,”
Brown argues plausibly that “criminal law’s substantive scope is almost surely narrower in
most respects than in the past, at least in its effect on most citizens.” Id. at 225–26
(emphasis omitted).
61
See generally Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An
Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2005).
62
Jackson, supra note 25, at 5. Justice Scalia quoted this passage toward the end of his
now celebrated dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727–28 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
63
Jackson, supra note 25, at 5.
64
Id.

2. SKLANSKY

486

3/31/2017 2:20 PM

SKLANSKY

[Vol. 106

was something wrong with a “pretextual prosecution.”65 But that intuition
has weakened, and the term itself has begun to sound archaic. More and
more, prosecutors are applauded for “picking the man and then searching
the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on
him.”66 This is exactly what is meant, for example, by “intelligence-driven
prosecution.”67 Here is how a supervisor with the Manhattan District
Attorney’s office describes the strategy: “We figured out who are the
people driving crime in Manhattan, and for four years we focused on taking
them out.”68
The fading stigma associated with pretextual prosecutions is part of a
broader trend in legal consciousness. For want of a better term, this larger
trend might be called “ad hoc instrumentalism”; it is the tendency to view
legal procedures as a set of interchangeable tools, which government
officials can and should apply on a case-by-case basis, depending on what
promises to be effective in addressing a particular problem or particular
individuals thought to be dangerous or undesirable.69 Deferred prosecution
and non-prosecution agreements reached with large organizations reflect
this same trend: they allow prosecutors to use the criminal law as a
bludgeon to coerce broad, organizational reform.70 Crimmigration—the
blurring of the line between criminal law and immigration—is part of this
trend, too; so is the use of parole and probation revocations as a parallel
system of criminal justice.71 Each of these developments has served to
increase the subjects and the scope of prosecutorial power, by expanding
the range of individuals who are potential defendants in criminal cases,
and—more importantly—by expanding the range of conduct that it seems
appropriate for prosecutors to coerce.
The bottom line is that the subjects and scope of prosecutorial power,
while very far from unlimited, have long been appreciable and have
65

See, e.g., Richman & Stuntz, supra note 61.
Jackson, supra note 25, at 5.
67
See Brown, supra note 23; Mac Donald, supra note 24.
68
See Brown, supra note 23 (quoting Karen Friedman Agnifilo); cf. Jessica Anderson &
Justin Fenton, Mosby Announces New Leadership, Strategies, BALT. SUN (Jan. 14, 2015),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-mosby-staff-changes-2015011
4-story.html (describing creation of new unit in Baltimore State’s Attorney’s Office to “help
target problem individuals”).
69
See Sklansky, supra note 59. This was the set of ideas that California prosecutors
reflexively, if unsuccessfully, invoked when they argued for keeping grand jury proceedings
available as an optional “tool” in cases involving deaths at the hands of the police. See
Gutierrez, supra note 10.
70
See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 56.
71
See Sklansky, supra note 59, at 197–208.
66
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recently grown larger. What about the magnitude of prosecutorial power?
By “magnitude” I mean roughly what Robert Dahl called the “amount” of
power: “the change in probabilities” caused by the exercise of power.72 In
other words, how strongly can a prosecutor change the likelihood that a
particular subject of prosecutorial power will engage in certain conduct
within the scope of prosecutorial power? How much more likely can a
prosecutor make it that, say, a defendant will be convicted, that a noncitizen
will be deported, or that a corporation will change its accounting
procedures?
The core of prosecutorial power is the ability to convict people of
crimes. More particularly, the core of prosecutorial power in the United
States today, as it is generally described, is the ability to coerce guilty pleas.
So let us begin there. What can be said about the magnitude of this core
aspect of prosecutorial power?
It will not do simply to say that prosecutors must have “virtually
absolute power” since “[e]veryone pleads guilty.”73 Everyone doesn’t plead
guilty. Most people are never charged, and many people who are charged
have their cases thrown out.74 It is true that criminal defendants whose cases
are not dismissed plead guilty at very high rates, upwards of 90%. Guilty
pleas vastly outnumber trials.75 But some of that, obviously, is case
selection. Conviction rates are high in part because prosecutors choose
their defendants and because judges dismiss the weakest cases.76 Another
part of the explanation for high conviction rates is that prosecutors trade
things away: that is what makes a plea bargain a plea bargain. The majority
of civil cases wind up settling, too,77 but most people do not take this as
proof that civil plaintiffs have vast power, or even that they have the upper
hand.78
72

Dahl, supra note 45, at 203, 206. On Dahl’s views of power and their impact, see,
e.g., CLEGG, supra note 44, at 1–59.
73
Miller, supra note 37, at 1252.
74
See David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving
Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J.
683, 696 n.37 (2006).
75
See, e.g., id.
76
Cf. Dahl, supra note 45, at 202 (“Suppose I stand on a street corner and say to myself,
‘I command all automobile drivers on this street to drive on the right side of the road’;
suppose further that all the drivers actually do as I ‘command’ them to do; still, most people
will regard me as mentally ill if I insist that I have enough power over automobile drivers to
compel them to use the right side of the road.”). Dahl stressed that power is the ability to
convince someone to do something that he or she “would not otherwise do.” Id. at 203;
accord WRONG, supra note 44, at 5–6.
77
See Sklansky & Yeazell, supra note 74, at 696.
78
The corporate defense bar sometimes argues along these lines, but the corporate
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In assessing the magnitude of prosecutorial power, it may be helpful to
supplement Dahl’s probabilistic measure with what Dennis Wrong calls the
“intensity” of power: the “limits . . . to the actions which the power holder
can influence the power subject to perform.”79 The rate at which defendants
plead guilty is a weak measure of the intensity of prosecutorial power: it
does not tell us how far prosecutors could push defendants, or what limits
there are to the consequences defendants would accept as the price of a
deal.
It is widely thought that prosecutors have enormous leverage when
negotiating plea agreements—far more leverage than criminal defendants.80
This may well be true, but it is difficult to measure the extent of this
leverage or even to define it with precision. Sometimes it is suggested that
prosecutors can dictate whatever outcomes they want, or, equivalently, that
they have no reason to trade away anything in plea bargaining, because
going to trial is essentially costless for them: it does not appreciably tax
their resources, and their risk of losing is insignificant. That is, at best, an
exaggeration. If prosecutors had no incentive to bargain, they would not,
and they do. How much they are willing to bargain away is, of course, a
different question. The broad consensus among scholars is that prosecutors
today are able to bargain for the results they want without giving up much
that is important to them, because the outcomes they can credibly threaten
under modern sentencing statutes are extraordinarily harsh.81 If that is so,
however, the fault could be said—and sometimes is said—to lie with the
sentencing statutes, not with prosecutorial power per se.
Four more points about prosecutorial power: first, concerns about
prosecutorial power are bound up with but distinguishable from concerns
about prosecutorial discretion. Concerns about prosecutorial power are
concerns about the prosecutor’s ability to influence or determine the
outcome of criminal cases; in the context of plea bargaining, concerns about
prosecutorial power are concerns about the prosecutor’s clout vis-à-vis the
defendant. Concerns about prosecutorial discretion are concerns about the
ability of individual prosecutors, or their offices, to exercise their power
unilaterally, without checks by other government officials. Excessive
prosecutorial power can raise concerns even when prosecutors act within a
web of constraints imposed by their superiors, by courts, or by other
defense bar is not most people.
79
WRONG, supra note 44, at 5–6. This measure obviously makes sense only for what
Wrong calls “power over.” See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
80
See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 38, at 56.
81
See, e.g., id.; United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 419–20 (E.D.N.Y. 2013);
Barkow, supra note 2, at 881; Miller, supra note 37.
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government agencies; even when subject to checks and balances,
prosecutorial power is a particularly coercive form of government power,
and therefore worth worrying about. And there can be concerns about
prosecutorial discretion even when prosecutorial power is relatively limited:
even if prosecutors have difficulty securing convictions or securing plea
bargains, their discretion to forego charging altogether may be troubling.
Still, the more discretion that prosecutors have, the greater will be the
concern, generally speaking, about the power they exercise and vice versa.
Moreover, the line between power and discretion, as I am using those terms,
is not always sharp. Mandatory sentencing rules can be understood to
increase the power of prosecutors by increasing their ability to control the
outcome of criminal cases,82 but those laws can also be understood as
increasing prosecutors’ discretion, by eliminating what would otherwise
function as a judicial check on charging decisions.
Second, concerns about prosecutorial power and about prosecutorial
discretion are often intertwined with concerns about prosecutors breaking
the law. This is because there are legal constraints on what prosecutors can
do, curtailing both their power and their discretion, but the constraints are
often weakly enforced. For example, prosecutors are required to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense,83 but when they fail to do so, the
violation may never come to light, or it may come to light when it is too late
for the evidence to be useful.84 Prosecutors are prohibited from exercising
peremptory challenges against prospective jurors on the basis of race or
gender,85 but proving that they have done so is notoriously difficult.86 It is
even more difficult to prove that prosecutors have relied on race, ethnicity,
or political affiliation when making charging decisions, although they are
prohibited from doing that as well.87 Prosecutorial illegality is objectionable
in part precisely because it can vitiate constraints on prosecutorial power
and prosecutorial discretion, but often it is also objectionable on other
82
See, e.g., Starr & Rehavi, supra note 1, at 13 (arguing that federal sentencing
guidelines “did not really increase prosecutors’ discretion, which was already almost
boundless,” but “increased their power,” because “the choices prosecutors made more
conclusively determined the sentence”).
83
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86–87 (1963).
84
See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 8, at 130–35.
85
See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1993); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
84 (1986).
86
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, New Questions on Racial Gap in Filling Juries, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 2015, at A1.
87
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–70 (1996); Angela J. Davis,
Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role of the Prosecutor, 39 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202, 210–18 (2007).
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grounds.
Third, we have been focusing on the prosecutor’s power to control the
outcome of particular criminal cases, but prosecutors also have an ability to
shape criminal justice policy at a broader level. They get investigatory
agencies to change their priorities, they block some legislation and push
through other laws, and they set the agenda for public discussions about
crime and punishment.88 Elected district attorneys and presidentiallyappointed United States Attorneys, in particular, often serve as de facto
leaders of the criminal justice system. Unlike the prosecutor’s control over
particular criminal cases, which is typically exercised though express or
implied coercion, the prosecutor’s influence on criminal justice policy
usually relies on other forms of persuasion, ranging from rhetorical appeals
to promises of shared prestige.89 The prosecutor’s coercive power is
typically what people have in mind when they worry about prosecutorial
power.90 By contrast, when people think of prosecutors as potential
solutions to the ills of the criminal justice, they often have in mind the
prosecutor’s ability to influence policy.91
Fourth and finally, the limitations on the subjects and scope of
prosecutorial power—despite their gradual loosening—may help to explain
the expansive magnitude of prosecutorial power. There is often an inverse
relationship between the range of power and its weight or intensity, in part
because of the logistical difficulties created when power is exercised over a
greater number of people.92 In the case of prosecutors, another factor is at
work: the fact that prosecutorial power mainly affects criminal defendants
88

See, e.g., Nirej Sekhon, The Pedagogical Prosecutor, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1

(2014).
89

In Galbraith’s terms, “conditioned power” or “compensatory power” rather than
“condign power.” See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
90
But not always: over the past decade, in particular, concerns have often been raised
about the political power of prosecutors. See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH
CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A
CULTURE OF FEAR 33–74 (2007); Bob Egelko, Opinion, Voters, not Law, Determine
Punishments in California, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 28, 2015) http://www.sfchronicle.com/
opinion/article/Voters-not-law-determine-punishments-in-6471595.php; Barkow, supra note
2, at 911.
91
See, e.g., Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125,
165–66 (2008).
92
See WRONG, supra note 44, at 20. “First, the greater the number of power subjects,
the greater the difficulty of supervising all of their activities. Second, the greater the number
of power subjects, the more extended and differentiated the chain of command necessary to
control them, creating new subordinate centres of power that can be played off against each
other and that may themselves become foci of opposition to the integral power-holder.
Third, the greater the number of subjects, the greater the likelihood of wide variation in their
attitudes toward the power-holder.” Id.
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and criminal suspects means that most people do not imagine that they may
be subject to prosecutorial power, and they have limited sympathy for the
people they suppose will wind up in that category.93 That may lead them to
be more tolerant of concentrating power in the hands of prosecutors than
they would be if prosecutors made decisions that directly affected things
other than criminal cases, things that people imagine might wind up
affecting them. It does not explain, though, why prosecutors have such
broad discretion—including the virtually unfettered freedom to decline to
file charges. Nor does it explain why American prosecutors, at least, seem
to have so much more power than the police or than judges in criminal
cases.
B. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND UNEXCEPTIONALISM

Prosecutorial power has long been thought a “uniquely American”
phenomenon.94 The American prosecutor, it is often said, “has no equal
throughout the world.”95 “Police, courts, and corrections systems are much
the same in all developed countries, but prosecutors differ radically,”
particularly when American prosecutors are compared their counterparts
overseas.96
The unparalleled authority of the American prosecutor has often been
attributed to the fact that district attorneys in the United States are elected,
county-level officials. Prosecutorial power, in this view, is an outgrowth of
the peculiar emphasis the United States places on local, democratic
control.97 The “locally elected status” of American prosecuting attorneys
provides them with an “independent source of power” and is the reason
they enjoy “discretionary privilege unmatched in the world.”98
This view of prosecutorial power—tying it to the local, democratic
selection of district attorneys—has always had some weaknesses. To begin
with, not all district attorneys in the United States are elected, and there is
little indication that they are less powerful in the states where they are
appointed.99 Nor is there any indication that sheriffs, who generally are
93

See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of
Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused,
44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal
Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 782–83 (2006).
94
JACOBY, supra note 17, at xv; see also id. at 5–6.
95
Worrall, supra note 18, at 4.
96
Tonry, supra note 2, at 1, 5.
97
See JACOBY, supra note 17, at xvii, xxi, 22–23; Pizzi, supra note 17, at 1343–44.
98
JACOBY, supra note 17, at xxi, 3.
99
Chief prosecuting attorneys are appointed by the state attorney general, rather than
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elected, are more powerful than police chiefs, who generally are appointed.
All of these officials are locally selected, of course, even if not by popular
vote, but federal law enforcement officials—including, in particular, United
States Attorneys—seem at least as powerful as their local counterparts.100
The biggest problem with tracing prosecutorial power to the local
election of district attorneys, though, is that American prosecutors no longer
seem so exceptional.
European prosecutors, in particular, look more and more like their
United States counterparts.101 Supervisory power over police investigations
in Europe is increasingly relocated from investigating magistrates—a
position in sharp decline—either to prosecutors or to the police
themselves.102 Meanwhile, prosecutors across Europe have gained new
powers to negotiate settlements of criminal cases and often to implement
those settlements with little or no judicial involvement.103 One important
development in this regard is increased use of the “penal order”—
essentially an adjudication and sentence, typically for a minor offense,
entirely crafted by the prosecutor.104 In theory, a penal order can be
appealed to a judge, but in practice, it rarely is; in exchange for foregoing a
judicial forum the defendant gains a measure of lenience. For all practical
purposes, penal orders are thus a form of plea bargaining, a practice that
European countries used to eschew, at least nominally.105 But “the advance
elected locally, in Alaska, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware and New Jersey. See
Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593, 598–99 (2014).
100
See, e.g., Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and the Federal Criminal Enforcement
Power, 123 YALE L.J. 2236 (2014).
101
Prosecutors are more powerful in Japan than in Europe or even the United States, but
Japan in its own ways is a special case, in part because of heavy reliance it places on elite
bureaucracies more broadly. See DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE:
PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 3, 48, 127–30 (2002). The rise of prosecutorial power in
Europe is harder to explain away.
102
See Thomas Weigend, A Judge by Another Name? Comparative Perspectives on the
Role of the Public Prosecutor, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 377,
378–79 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012).
103
See id. at 383–87; Jörg-Martin Jehle, The Function of Public Prosecution Within the
Criminal Justice System: Aim, Approach and Outcome of a European Comparative Study, in
COPING WITH OVERLOADED CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: THE RISE OF PROSECUTORIAL POWER
ACROSS EUROPE 3, 6 (Jörg-Martin Jehle & Marianne Wade eds., 2006); Luna & Wade, supra
note 19, at 1414–15.
104
See, e.g., Thaman, supra note 43, at 159–73; Josef Zila, Prosecutorial Powers and
Policy Making in Sweden and the Other Nordic Countries, in THE PROSECUTOR IN
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 235, 249 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012).
105
See, e.g., Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The
Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2004).
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of negotiated criminal judgments over the last twenty years has been the
signature development on the European continent,”106 and the “bannercarrier” in this advance has been the prosecutor, “a ‘standing magistrate’
who today looms over his or her ‘sitting’ colleague in the courts both in
power and importance.”107
Even in Germany—praised by American scholars a generation ago as a
“land without plea bargaining”108—consensual case resolutions have
become the norm,109 and “prosecutors now submit less than 20 percent of
the cases that cross their desks to the court for a full adjudicative
hearing.”110 Decisions by German prosecutors today “shape, if not
determine, outcomes in the vast majority of cases, with the shape of that
discretion bounded only weakly by the law.”111
In theory, prosecutors in some European countries still operate under
the “principle of legality” rather than the “principle of expediency,”112
which means that they still lack a key aspect of the discretion explicitly
granted to American prosecutors: the leeway to forego pursuit of a criminal
case altogether. However, the legality principle is “far from absolute in
practice.”113 In Germany, for example, mandatory prosecution is “reserved

106

Weigend, supra note 102, at 387. See also Langer, supra note 105.
Thaman, supra note 43, at 156. Prosecutors also loom over judges in significance in
most if not all of the international criminal tribunals created in recent decades. Discussions
of the International Criminal Court, for example, tend to focus heavily on the decisions of its
chief prosecutor. See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, Is the War Crimes Court Still Relevant?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2015, at SR4.
108
E.g., John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78
MICH. L. REV. 204 (1979); see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 194 (1969).
109
Thomas Weigend & Jenia Iontcheva Turner, The Constitutionality of Negotiated
Criminal Judgments in Germany, 15 GERMAN L.J. 81, 82–83 (2014).
110
Shawn Boyne, Is the Journey from the In-Box to the Out-Box a Straight Line? The
Drive for Efficiency and the Prosecution of Low-Level Criminality in Germany, in THE
PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 37, 38 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds.,
2012) (citing figures by Jehle and Wade).
111
Id. at 42. German plea bargaining appears to have begun, slowly at first, in the
1970s. See Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the
Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 549–50 (1997); Joachim Herrman,
Bargaining Justice—A Bargain for German Criminal Justice?, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 755, 755
(1992).
112
See Mirjan Damaška, The Reality of Prosecutorial Discretion: Comments on a
German Monograph, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 119, 120–21 (1981).
113
Michele Caianiello, The Italian Public Prosecutor: An Inquisitorial Figure in
Adversarial Proceedings?, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 250, 255
(Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); see also, e.g., Jehle, supra note 103, at 24.
107
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for only the most serious crimes,”114 which makes any difference from the
United States in this regard largely a matter of form.115
Three caveats are necessary. First, prosecutorial authority has
expanded further in some countries than in others. In England, Finland, and
Hungary, for example, prosecutors still submit the majority of the cases that
cross their desk for full adjudicative resolution.116 England’s Crown
Prosecution Service has grown “more confident and influential” over the
past couple of decades, but it is still very far from exercising the kind of
power that American prosecutors—or, increasingly, Continental
prosecutors—have over investigations, sentences, and negotiated caseendings.117 Second, even in countries where prosecutors have gained a
measure of discretion approaching what they have in the United States,
their power, in important respects, may remain much more circumscribed,
simply because the available sanctions in criminal cases are much less
severe.118 Third, and probably most important, even if the formal authority
of some European prosecutors now approaches that of their American
counterparts, the scholarly consensus still tends to see American
prosecutors as unique—and, usually, as uniquely threatening—both because
prosecutorial offices in the United States are thought to lack the internal
bureaucratic safeguards of European prosecution services, and because the
professional culture of prosecutors in the United States is thought to be less
professional and more adversarial than in Europe.119
Still, the growing power of European prosecutors, no matter how
tamed it is by professional culture and internal oversight, makes it
increasingly difficult to see prosecutorial power as the straightforward
consequence of America’s commitment to local, democratic government. It
also makes it more important than ever to try to understand why prosecutors

114

Boyne, supra note 107, at 41.
See, e.g., BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, RACE AND
PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN 3–4 (2014) (noting that the Manhattan District Attorney’s
Office “prosecutes nearly all cases brought by the police, including 94 percent of felonies, 96
percent of misdemeanors, and 89 percent of violations”).
116
See Boyne, supra note 110, at 38.
117
Lewis, supra note 20, at 219, 233.
118
See, e.g., Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade, Introduction to OVERVIEW AND
OUTLOOK—TOWARD COMPARATIVE PROSECUTION STUDIES, in THE PROSECUTOR IN
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 365, 376 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012).
119
See id.; Damaška, supra note 112, at 136–38; Pizzi, supra note 17, at 1350; Tonry,
supra note 2, at 7, 17–18. The same is true when comparing American prosecutors with
their Japanese counterparts, who are equally if not more powerful, but work more
collectively and with far more bureaucratic oversight. See JOHNSON, supra note 101, at 119–
43.
115
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have been given so much authority and why they seem to keep
accumulating more.
C. PLEA BARGAINING AND CASELOADS

There is an orthodox explanation for the rise of prosecutorial power
both in the United States and in Europe, and it is relatively simple.
Criminal caseloads have risen, overtaxing traditional, trial-based systems of
adjudication. That has forced greater and greater reliance on plea
bargaining, and the reliance on plea bargaining has in turn expanded the
role and the influence of prosecutors. The growing power of prosecutors on
both sides of the Atlantic is attributed to “the intense pressure created by
overloaded criminal dockets, forcing systems to find means other than fullfledged trials to deal with their ever-increasing caseloads.”120
It is easy to see the appeal of this explanation. Plea bargaining has
been on the rise for over a century in the United States121 and for the past
few decades in Europe.122 And plea bargains are simpler and quicker than
trials, so it seems entirely plausible that burgeoning caseloads lie behind the
“triumphal march of consensual procedural forms”123 in criminal
adjudication.
Nonetheless the argument tracing prosecutorial power to surging
criminal caseloads has two serious weaknesses. First, it is not clear that
plea bargaining has risen in response to rising caseloads, as opposed to vice
versa. George Fisher, in his careful history of plea bargaining in the United
States, takes it as obvious that rising caseloads increase the pressure on
prosecutors to resolve cases before trial, but he also stresses that caseload
pressure is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for plea
bargaining.124 Prosecutors plea bargain whenever they can, partly to reduce
120
Luna & Wade, supra note 118, at 365; see also, e.g., Marc L. Miller & Ronald F.
Wright, Reporting for Duty: The Universal Prosecutorial Accountability Puzzle and an
Experimental Transparency Alternative, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 392, 400 (Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012); Boyne, supra note 110,
at 41; Jehle, supra note 103; Lewis, supra note 20, at 219; Luna & Wade, supra note 19, at
1439–40; Thaman, supra note 43, at 156; Weigend, supra note 102, at 383, 387; Zila, supra
note 20, at 249.
121
See FISHER, supra note 41.
122
See, e.g., Boyne, supra note 110, at 38; Langer, supra note 105, at 35–62; Thaman,
supra note 43, at 156.
123
Thaman, supra note 43, at 156 (quoting Thomas Weigend, Die Reform des
Strafverfahrens Eu: Europäische und deutsche Tendenzen und Probleme, [The Reform of
Criminal Proceedings: European and German Trends and Problems], in 104 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTWISSENSCHAFT 486, 492 (1992)).
124
See FISHER, supra note 41, at 44.
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their workload and partly to avoid the risk of acquittal.125 And once plea
bargaining begins, it tends to become entrenched by virtue of “its sheer
efficiency . . . as a means of clearing cases”; it allows caseloads to rise
without commensurate increases in staffing.126 Because “the cost and
availability of services, including the services of judges and prosecutors,
affects demand for them,” caseloads may rise to meet the capacity of the
adjudication system, in the same way that building more lanes brings more
cars onto the road.127 Traffic engineers call this the “fundamental law of
highway congestion”: vehicle-miles traveled increase in direct proportion to
space on the road.128 And “[a]dding court capacity may work like adding
highway capacity.”129
Second, plea bargaining does not necessarily increase prosecutorial
power. It may be the result of prosecutorial power, or at least one particular
form of prosecutorial discretion, namely the discretion to drop charges.
Alternatively, it may be a sign of prosecutorial weakness: the inability to
125
See, e.g., id. at 90, 178; Vorenberg, supra note 41, at 1532–33. Accordingly,
Vorenberg noted that “[e]ven when the docket is manageable, plea bargaining may still be
used freely.” Id. at 1533. Studying Connecticut trial courts several decades ago, Malcolm
Feeley found no connection between caseloads and rates of plea bargaining. MALCOLM M.
FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT
244–67 (paperback ed. 1992). Based on his observations and on a review of English court
records from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Feeley concluded that plea bargaining
emerged hand-in-hand with the modern, adversarial criminal trial. See generally Malcolm
M. Feeley, Legal Complexity and the Transformation of the Criminal Process: The Origins
of Plea Bargaining, 31 ISR. L. REV. 183 (1997).
126
See FISHER, supra note 41, at 176.
127
Darryl K. Brown, Reforming the Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, in The Future of
Criminal Law: Working Papers from the 2014 Annual Conference of the Robina Institute of
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, supra note 30, at 75, 84; see also BROWN, supra note 21,
at 158–64.
128
Gilles Duranton & Matthew A. Turner, The Fundamental Law of Road Congestion:
Evidence from US Cities, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 2616, 2616 (2011); see also ANTHONY
DOWNS, STUCK IN TRAFFIC: COPING WITH PEAK-HOUR TRAFFIC CONGESTION 27–31 (1992).
129
Brown, supra note 127, at 83. Rising criminal caseloads are sometimes attributed to
rising crime rates. See, e.g., Jehle, supra note 103, at 5; Thaman, supra note 43, at 156. But
the chief measures of crime are notoriously unreliable, and the most common measures—
arrests and convictions—are determined in large part by levels of enforcement. Moreover,
regardless how they are measured, crime rates are a function of what society chooses to
classify as criminal, and that decision, too, can be influenced by the case-processing capacity
of the adjudicatory system. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 21, at 158–59. Rates of
homicide—a crime with a relatively stable definition and consistently high rates of
reporting—have been in long-term decline for centuries both in Europe and in North
America, and the periods of increase do not correlate well with rises in plea bargaining or in
prosecutorial power. It is worth noting, too, that the western society with arguably the most
powerful prosecutors—Japan—has neither high crime rates nor high caseloads. See
JOHNSON, supra note 101, at 22–24.
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proceed to trial with confidence of victory. But the mere fact that cases are
resolved consensually does not increase prosecutorial power in any obvious
way, any more than a rise in civil settlements boosts the power of
plaintiffs.130 Nor is it immediately clear why prosecutors, as opposed to
judges or defense attorneys, should be the “banner-carrier”131 in the shift
away from criminal trials. Fisher argues that plea bargaining triumphed in
the United States only because all three principal courtroom actors in the
criminal courts—prosecutors, defendants, and judges—found it
advantageous.132
Occasionally, the growing clout of American prosecutors—or at least
the failure of courts and legislators to do anything about it—has been
blamed not on plea bargaining or burgeoning caseloads, but on something
at once simpler and deeper: the politics of crime.133 Escalating crime rates,
it has sometimes been suggested, created a one-way ratchet for tougher and
tougher law enforcement, and giving prosecutors more leeway was just part
of the package.134 But prosecutors have been accumulating power for more
than a century; the trend began well before the emergence of the late
twentieth century “culture of control.”135 Furthermore, the waning fear of
crime in recent years136 has done nothing to reverse the growth of
prosecutorial power. Over the past decade all kinds of proposals have
gained traction for making American criminal justice less punitive and
heavy-handed, from restrictions on investigative stops to lower sentences,
expanded opportunities for parole, and lower hurdles for clemency.137 In a
small but noteworthy number of recent cases, elected prosecutors made
promises that not long ago might have been political suicide: less punitive
policies, greater vigilance against wrongful convictions, or more scrutiny of
130
See, e.g., Feeley, supra note 125, at 221 (suggesting that plea bargaining may have
“expanded and not contracted the powers of the accused”); cf. Barkow, supra note 2, at 909–
10 (arguing that a reduction or elimination of plea bargaining would not significantly reduce
prosecutorial power, because “[i]f charging discretion exists, so does the power to
adjudicate”).
131
Thaman, supra note 43, at 156.
132
See FISHER, supra note 41, at 110, 178, 198–200.
133
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 2, at 884–87, 910, 912–13, 921.
134
See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 90, at 33–34, 53–60, 70–74, 102.
135
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 1–26 (2001).
136
See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE (2006);
David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 35
(2011).
137
See, e.g., JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR. ET AL., SOLUTIONS: AMERICAN LEADERS SPEAK OUT
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Inimai Chettiar & Michael Waldman eds., 2015); Jennifer Steinhauer,
Bipartisan Push Builds to Relax Sentencing Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2015, at A1.
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the police.138 But neither prosecutorial power nor prosecutorial discretion
has been significantly curtailed.
Sometimes the rise of prosecutorial power has been attributed not to
plea bargaining and not to the politics of crime but to “the growing
complexity” of the criminal justice system.139 This is said to make it harder
for judges to supervise prosecutors,140 harder for judges rather than
prosecutors to supervise the police,141 and easier for prosecutors to steer
cases to the outcomes they think appropriate.142
The complexity
explanation, like the caseloads explanation and the fear-of-crime
explanation, is radically incomplete. One wants to know what it is about
prosecutors that makes them outcompete judges and other officials in an
environment of complexity. But focusing on complexity sends us down the
right path.
II. INTERMEDIATION
If virtually every discussion of prosecutors begins with their power,
most soon take note of one or another organizational or conceptual divide
that prosecutors seem to bestride. Prosecutors “straddle a line that separates
courts from politics.”143 They operate “in a dual capacity . . . as both
attorney and client.”144 They “ha[ve] always been situated in an
(uncomfortable) tug and pull between the partisan advocacy sphere of trial
and impartial justice-seeking.”145 They exercise “both executive and judicial
power,”146 playing “a quasi-magisterial role, somewhere between police
officer and judge.”147 It is rare for more than one of these boundary
crossings to be noted in the same argument, and usually the ambiguity of
the prosecutor’s role is mentioned only in passing, as a kind of expository
138
See David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected
Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2017).
139
Caianiello, supra note 113, at 255; see also Weigend, supra note 102, at 384.
140
See Damaška, supra note 112, at 130.
141
See Weigend, supra note 102, at 379.
142
See id. at 384.
143
Worrall, supra note 18, at 4.
144
People v. Kelley, 142 Cal. Rptr. 457, 466 (Ct. App. 1977).
145
Jennifer E. Laurin, Quasi-Inquisitorialism: Accounting for Deference in Pretrial
Criminal Procedure, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 823 (2014); see also, e.g., Cheney v.
United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 386 (2004) (noting that a
prosecutor is obligated “not only to win and zealously to advocate for his client but also to
serve the cause of justice”).
146
Barkow, supra note 36, at 1048.
147
JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 193 (Christine Cardone ed., 3d ed. 1994).
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scaffolding, the way a guidebook might describe some travel destination as
a “land of many contrasts.”148 On other occasions the category-defying
nature of prosecutors is stressed as a way of underscoring how poorly they
fit within the legal order they are supposed to serve.149
I want to suggest something different here: that boundary-blurring is
central rather than incidental to the prosecutor’s role and a critical part of
the explanation for the growth of prosecutorial power. I will start by
discussing three particularly important divides that prosecutors bridge:
between adversarial and inquisitorial justice, between the police and the
courts, and between law and discretion. The first and third of these divides
are conceptual and the second is organizational, but each will help to
demonstrate, I hope, the extent to which prosecutors operate as “mediating
figures,”150 akin in some ways to the “ritual specialists”151 and other
“culture-brokers”152 who, anthropologists tell us, “negotiate different social
interests” by “tread[ing] across natural and cultural boundaries.”153 After
discussing the ways in which prosecutors soften the adversarial/inquisitorial
divide, bridge the gap between law enforcement and adjudication, and
straddle the line between law and discretion, I will try to specify the
functions that prosecutors serve by blurring these boundaries, and the ways
in which the mediating nature of the prosecutor’s role can help to explain
the rise of prosecutorial power. The growing complexity of criminal justice
systems will be part of that explanation.
A. ADVERSARIAL AND INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE

It is hard to think of a distinction more fundamental in criminal
procedure, more venerable, or more frequently invoked, than the divide
between adversarial and inquisitorial forms of justice. American lawyers,
in particular, tend to treat their system’s commitment to adversarial
justice—and its rejection of the inquisitorial system—as its central defining
feature; certainly the lawyers who sit on the Supreme Court of the United
148

But cf. JACOBY, supra note 17, at xv (remarking that “[t]he prosecutor has a vague
image in the public eye, and much of this arises because the prosecutor’s own self-image is
fuzzy”).
149
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 36, at 1048; Caianiello, supra note 113, at 266; Luna,
supra note 37, at 57.
150
Susan J. Rasmussen, Only Women Know Trees: Medicine Women and the Role of
Herbal Healing in Tuareg Culture, 54 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 147, 147 (1998).
151
Id.
152
Susan J. Rasmussen, When the Field Space Comes to the Home Space: New
Constructions of Ethnographic Knowledge in a New African Diaspora, 76
ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 7, 7 (2003).
153
Rasmussen, supra note 150, at 147; see also id. at 154.
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States often think this way.154 Europeans sometimes identify their systems
as inquisitorial; more often they see them as combining elements of both
the adversarial and inquisitorial traditions.155 Either way, though, European
discussions of criminal procedure also tend to be shaped by the distinction
between adversarial and inquisitorial institutions, although not always so
strongly as in the United States.
While it is notoriously difficult to pin down the differences between
adversarial and inquisitorial justice—there is a fair amount of vagueness in
the way the terms are defined156—the core distinction, it is generally agreed,
is between forms of adjudication that rely on a contest between two
adversaries and those that depend instead on an official, impartial
inquiry.157 Prosecutors are conspicuously difficult to categorize within this
scheme. The prosecutor is a kind of “impartial party,”158 with a “dual role
as an advocate for the government and as an administrator of justice.”159 It
has long been “customary to note that while prosecutors act as the
government’s representative in the adversary system, they are expected to
be more (or is it less?) than an adversary.”160 One consequence of this inbetween status is that prosecutors are only loosely regulated by the rules of
professional conduct promulgated by bar associations: “[f]ew professional
conduct provisions specifically target their work, and those provisions are
mostly undemanding,” and “[c]ourts often interpret the generally applicable
154

(2009).

See David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1636–38

155
See id. at 1640; MAŁGORZATA WĄSEK-WIADEREK, THE PRINCIPLE OF “EQUALITY OF
ARMS” IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS FUNCTIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF SELECTED EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 48 (2000).
156
See Sklansky, supra note 154, at 1639, 1680–83.
157
See MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 3 (1986); Langer, supra note 105, at 17.
158
Caianiello, supra note 113, at 251 (quoting Pietro Calamandrei).
159
Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 51–52 (1998); see also, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8
cmt. (2007) (noting that “[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate”); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (2015) (describing the prosecutor as “an administrator of
justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court”); Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial
Constitutionalism, S. CAL. L. REV (forthcoming 2016) (noting that “[p]rosecutors in the
American system play an odd double role” as “partisan advocates” and as “neutral
implementer[s] of constitutional protections”).
160
Vorenberg, supra note 41, at 1557; cf. NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS, pt. 1 cmt.
(Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n 2009) (noting that “[a] prosecutor is not a mere advocate”);
Miller & Wright, supra note 91, at 178 (describing the prosecutor as “something more than a
litigant who operates ‘in the shadow of the law’”).
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rules of professional conduct as less restrictively applied to prosecutors than
to other lawyers.”161 Another consequence—more to the present point—is
that prosecutors “soften the distinction” between adversarial and
inquisitorial forms of justice162; the more prominent a role the prosecutor
plays in a system of criminal adjudication, the more difficult it is to
categorize that system as clearly adversarial or clearly inquisitorial.
Prosecutors therefore complicate the self-conception of legal systems on
both sides of the Atlantic.
In adversarial systems, the prosecutor often appears as an anomaly:
“an inquisitorial figure in adversarial proceedings.”163 This is notably true in
the United States, where prosecutors, at least in the pretrial stage, are often
described as performing an “essentially . . . inquisitorial” role164—and
frequently faulted for performing it with a mindset that is too adversarial.165
161

Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
873, 873–74 (2012); see also, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 8, at 143–54. The only provision of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct directly addressing prosecutors, Rule 3.8, says
nothing about the proper exercise of charging discretion, aside from suggesting that charges
should satisfy the undemanding standard of “probable cause.” Nor does the rule discuss
prosecutors’ “conduct before the grand jury, relations with the police and other law
enforcement officers, [or] relations with victims and government witnesses.” DAVIS, supra
note 8, at 147. Some of these latter matters are addressed in separate standards the ABA has
issued for prosecutors, see PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 13, and in guidelines
developed by the National District Attorneys Association, see NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS, supra note 13, but both sets of standards are non-binding and largely anodyne.
On the critical question of charging discretion, for example, the ABA standards prohibit
filing charges that are based on “partisan political pressure or professional ambition or
improper personal considerations,” or that cannot “reasonably . . . be substantiated by
admissible evidence at trial.” Other than that, pretty much anything is fair game. See
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 13, at standard
3-4.4. The NDAA’s standards are more or less similar, see NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS, supra note 13, at §§ 4-1.3 & 4-1.4, as are the “Principles of Federal
Prosecution” promulgated by the United States Department of Justice, see UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.200–.760 (U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 1997). The Principles of
Federal Prosecution do take up the controversial and hugely important question of whether
and in what way prosecutors should take potential penalties into account in selecting
charges, but what they on that subject is so convoluted and contradictory it offers little
genuine guidance. See id. § 9-27.300; David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the
Prosecutor’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 533–36 (1999).
162
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1673, 1674 (2015).
163
Caianiello, supra note 113, at 251 (describing Italian prosecutors); see also, e.g.,
Bibas, supra note 37, at 994 (describing American prosecutors as “not mere partisan
advocates, but officers of the court”).
164
Lynch, supra note 162, at 1674; see also, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,
181 n.2 (1991); Laurin, supra note 145, at 811.
165
See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 8; Tonry, supra note 2. Increasingly, American
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But at other times, American prosecutors are criticized for being
insufficiently adversarial in their handling of investigations: this was the
gravamen of many of the complaints in 2014 after prosecutors in Missouri
and New York failed to secure indictments of white police officers who had
killed unarmed black men.166 In systems within the inquisitorial tradition,
meanwhile, prosecutors are often understood as advocates, at least at the
trial stage. How else to make sense of the longstanding European
commitment to “equality of arms” in criminal procedure,167 or the repeated
insistence by the European Court of Human Rights on a sharp “separation
of the duties of accusation and adjudication,”168 prohibiting an official from
acting both as prosecutor and judge in the same case?169 The European
prosecutor is often described as, in theory, “a detached ‘guardian of the
law’”170—a “judicial” officer “operating under the same professional
obligations of balance and fairness . . . that apply to judges.”171 The reality,
though—repeatedly acknowledged by European scholars—is that once an
accusation is filed, the European prosecutor, like his or her American
counterpart, “is cast in the role of the accuser, seeking to persuade the court
of the defendant’s guilt rather than to neutrally present evidence in a
detached fashion.”172 The fairness of adjudicatory proceedings, a leading
scholar of continental criminal proceeding has stressed, “is not as such
endangered by a partial prosecutor. One might be tempted to argue to the
contrary.”173
B. POLICE AND COURTS

One reason it is plausible to see prosecutors either as adversarial or
prosecutors are also taking on an inquisitorial role at the back end of the adjudicatory
process, forming “conviction integrity units” to assess claims of innocence from convicted
defendants. See, e.g., Dana Carver Boehm, The New Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Prosecutorial
Ethics and the Evaluation of Actual Innocence, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 613, 627–45; Laurie L.
Levenson, The Problem With Cynical Prosecutor’s Syndrome: Rethinking a Prosecutor’s
Role in Post-Conviction Cases, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 335, 369–70, 385 (2015).
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inquisitorial figures is that they “provide the link between police
investigation and courtroom adjudication”174—between “zealous
officers . . . engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime”175 and “neutral and detached”176 judicial personnel. Prosecutors are
the “gatekeepers”177 of the criminal justice system; they oversee “the
transition from the investigative phase to adjudication in court,”178 playing
“a quasi-magisterial role, somewhere between police officer and judge.”179
They have a foot in each camp. On the one hand, they work closely with
law enforcement officers and often see themselves as investigators and
crime fighters,180 on the other hand, like judges they are trained in the law
and are “officers of the court”181; in some civil law systems, they share the
same occupational status as judges.182
Because they pass back and forth between these two worlds,
prosecutors are relied upon both to bring the police within the rule of law
and to make the rule of law compatible with the realities of policing.
Prosecutors present and defend the work of the police in court, but they also
explain and legitimize the law to the police, and—in varying degrees—
supervise the police to ensure they comply with the law.183 They are
envoys—“culture-brokers”184—between the realm of the judges and the
174

Erik Luna and Marianne L. Wade, Introduction to The Prosecutor as Policy Maker,
Case Manager, and Investigator, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 1
(Erik Luna & Marianne L. Wade eds., 2012).
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Caianiello, supra note 113, at 256; Weigend, supra note 102, at 377.
180
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E.g., Bibas, supra note 37, at 994.
182
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prosecutors); Brown, supra note 23 (quoting the argument of Steve Zeidman, director of the
Criminal Defense Clinic at CUNY School of Law, that “[p]rosecutors are supposed to be the
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domain of law enforcement, between the courtroom and the squad room.
Prosecutors thus mediate between courts and police in at least two
different ways. First, the prosecutor’s duties contain elements both of law
enforcement and adjudication: on the one hand the prosecutor helps to
direct police operations and works to secure criminal convictions; on the
other hand the prosecutor decides which cases to move forward and which
cases to drop, and—more and more, in an era of global plea bargaining—
the prosecutor “has become a ‘judge before the judge,’” determining
“whether a sanction will be imposed and how severe or lenient that sanction
will be.”185 Second, because their work requires them to travel back and
forth between the world of the policing and the world of the courtroom,
talking on a daily basis with officers and with judges, they serve to explain
the occupants of each world to those of the other, bridging a cultural divide
and “negotiat[ing] different social interests.”186 They are translators and
organizational intermediaries.
C. LAW AND DISCRETION

In addition to blurring the distinction between adversarial and
inquisitorial forms of justice, and bridging the gap between the police and
the courts, prosecutors straddle the divide between law and discretion. Here
is former Attorney General Eric Holder, explaining in 2009 how the United
States Department of Justice would make the politically explosive decision
whether to prosecute officials of the previous Administration who had
authorized or carried out torture: “We are going to follow the evidence,
follow the law and take that where it leads. No one is above the law.”187
That could have been virtually any prosecutor discussing almost any case;
prosecutors routinely wrap themselves in the mantle of the law. But the
American criminal justice system also relies heavily and explicitly on the
prosecutor’s leeway to forego enforcement: “[t]he rigors of the penal
system are . . . mitigated by the responsible exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.”188 “Although we expect prosecutors to follow the law, nobody
believes that prosecutors in the United States only follow the law—
discretionary application of criminal law is central to the prosecutor’s
role.”189 Civil law countries that follow the “legality” principle do expect
185
Weigend, supra note 102, at 378; see also Jehle, supra note 103, at 6; Luna & Wade,
supra note 19, at 1427.
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prosecutors to “only follow the law,” at least in theory, but there are fewer
of those countries today.190 And even the holdouts, it is widely
acknowledged, riddle the legality principle with exceptions, some official
and others unwritten.191
Every government functionary in every criminal justice system
navigates between law and discretion, of course. But police work involves
vastly more discretion than law, and pretty much the opposite is true of
judging. Police discretion is hemmed in only at the margins by legal
constraints192; judicial discretion, by and large, operates in the interstices of
the law. Prosecutors, midway between the world of law enforcement and
the world of the courts, move more fluidly between law and discretion than
either police officers or judges. No police officer today could ever claim
simply to be following the law and expect to be taken seriously, and few
judges would assert the authority, let alone the responsibility, to decline to
enforce a criminal law simply because it seems, in the circumstances,
inappropriate.
Prosecutors, in contrast, constantly mediate between law and
discretion; they are expected to “be accountable both to the people and to
their laws.”193 Mixing law and discretion is a deep and longstanding feature
of their job, especially in the United States. Prosecutors became salaried
workers in the nineteenth century, Nicholas Parrillo has shown, precisely
“so that they would have the financial independence to exercise
prosecutorial discretion”; legislators wanted prosecutors to “‘sand off’ the
hard edges of modern positivist legislation (which was inevitably broad and
rigid) and thereby vest it with legitimacy.”194 By mediating between law
and discretion, prosecutors thus also blurred the boundary between the
lawful and the prohibited.
In Parrillo’s account, prosecutorial discretion was critical in securing
acceptance of “alien imposition”: directives running contrary to “shared
social expectations,” issued by a “sovereign external to the community.”195
He takes laws of this kind to be “largely synonymous with modernity,” and
190
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he contrasts them with “familiar imposition,” an older form of governance
in which “the enforcer, the enforcee, and the norm being imposed all had
reference to a single face-to-face community.”196 This makes prosecutors
intermediaries in still another sense as well: they served—and continue to
serve—to reconcile the populace with a distant sovereign. They do that in
part by tempering law with discretion and softening the edges between the
lawful and the prohibited. They can accomplish those tasks because they
bridge the world of the police and the world of the courts—which also helps
them blur the boundary between adversarial and inquisitorial forms of
justice.
D. FLEXIBILITY AND COMPLEXITY.

Why would officials who are first and foremost mediating figures
come to dominate criminal justice, first in the United States and more
recently in Europe? Perhaps because modern criminal justice systems have
come to rely, more and more, on intermediation. The boundary-blurring
performed by prosecutors provides the legal order with three different kinds
of flexibility: ideological, institutional, and operational.
By ideological flexibility, I mean the ability of a system to fudge on its
commitments. The story that Parrillo tells, about prosecutors legitimating
alien imposition by blunting the edges of positivist prohibitions, is a story
of prosecutors letting the legal system equivocate: letting it prohibit conduct
without actually penalizing it, letting it insist on a “government of law not
of men” without requiring rigid enforcement of the laws.197 More recently,
prosecutorial discretion has allowed legislators to act “tough on crime”
without worrying much about the consequences: prosecutors have been
trusted to ensure that draconian penalties are imposed only on those who
truly deserve them.198 Blurring the boundary between adversarial and
inquisitorial forms of justice facilitates a different kind of ideological
196
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Violations, 16 VT. L. REV. 419, 423 (1991); Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization,
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flexibility: it allows a system to declare itself proudly “adversarial” or
“inquisitorial” without living with all the consequences.
Prosecutors provide institutional flexibility by bridging courts and
police, allowing the two organizations to function separately but in a
coordinated manner. The separation of functions between the police and
the courts is itself, in part, a strategy for reconciling antagonistic
allegiances—specifically, the dueling commitments to what Herbert
Packard called the “crime control model” and “due process model” of
criminal justice.199 We want to be safe from crime, but we also want
criminal suspects and criminal defendants to be treated fairly—the way we
ourselves would wish to be treated were we suspected or accused of
breaking the law. We deal with this tension in part by division of
responsibility: the police are charged with controlling crime, and the courts
with ensuring due process. Each agency pursues its separate mission, so
that neither set of values gets lost.200
That is the theory. In practice, judges often care a great deal about
crime control, and there are police officers who think a lot about fairness.
More to the point, the mounting complexity of criminal justice work makes
it progressively harder to maintain this separation of functions and still have
a system that works. Judges know less and less about what the police work
is like, and the police have a more and more attenuated sense of the
intellectual and professional world of judges.201 Mutual incomprehension
makes it increasingly hard for judges to oversee police work unilaterally,
and for the police, on their own, to ensure that their cases will hold up in
court, or even enter the system. Each side relies on envoys to the other, and
the envoys are prosecutors. Prosecutors make it possible for the courts and
the police to remain separate agencies with divergent missions, and they
therefore make it possible for the system to maintain its concurrent
commitments to crime control and to due process. The organizational
flexibility provided by prosecutors thus itself facilitates a certain kind of
ideological flexibility.
By blurring boundaries, prosecutors also provide the criminal justice
system with operational flexibility: the ability to change practices on the fly
in response to new challenges. Because prosecutors stand at the gateway to
the criminal justice system, mediating between the police and courts, and
because they are both agents of the law and vested with wide discretion,
they are able to redirect the energies of the criminal justice system, to
199
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recalibrate its severity, and to change its tactics. They can make these
changes rapidly, in individual cases and at the wholesale level. Prosecutors
can tailor charges, plea offers, and sentencing recommendations to
particular defendants. They can go further and offer to defer criminal
prosecution altogether if an individual or an organization agrees to . . . well,
pretty much to whatever terms the prosecutor thinks appropriate. By
aggregating many such decisions, or by adopting explicit policies to guide
their discretion, prosecutors can steer the entire criminal justice system in
new directions. There is evidence, for example, that the bulk of the sharp
increase in levels of incarceration in the United States over the past several
decades has been caused by prosecutors exercising their discretion to file
more charges.202 Similarly, prosecutors have been responsible for the
decision to suspend enforcement, for all practical purposes, of federal
marijuana laws in states that repealed their own prohibitions of marijuana
use.203 The nationwide ramp-up in charging appears to have been the result
of many retail-level decisions, whereas the change in federal marijuana
enforcement policy took the form of explicit guidelines adopted by the
Department of Justice. In each case, though, prosecutors were able to
redirect the operations of the criminal justice system through the exercise of
their discretion.
When prosecutors are lauded for taking a “data-driven,”204 “Moneyball
approach”205 to crime—in large part through the calculated use of what used
to be called pretextual prosecutions—they are being praised for, among
other things, using their flexibility. They are being applauded for breaking
free from ideological constraints, rigid institutional boundaries, and
operational inertia. The very substitution of terms like “intelligence-led
prosecution” for the older, more pejorative label of “pretextual prosecution”
is a sign of the broad changes in legal culture that have made the boundaryblurring carried out by prosecutors increasingly valuable, or at least
increasingly valued. Another sign is the growing tendency for prosecutors,
with all their intermediating abilities, to be held up as the models for new,
more flexible approaches to governance outside the criminal context. Thus,
for example, the Obama Administration broke the logjam over immigration
reform through a series of bureaucratic changes it defended as exercises of
“prosecutorial discretion” in immigration enforcement.206 Critics
202
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complained that the new immigration rules departed from how prosecutors
actually operated, but—tellingly—almost no one in this debate suggested
that prosecutorial discretion was itself a bad thing, something to be avoided
rather than emulated.207
It is difficult to pinpoint the social changes that have put a growing
premium on boundary-blurring in the criminal process and in the legal
system more broadly, but the explanation may well have to do with rising
legal complexity, and it almost certainly has to do with an increasing
preference for flexibility over institutional rigidity and hard-and-fast
commitments. As the sheer volume of legal rules and legal institutions has
grown, as legal rules have become progressively easier to access, and as
mechanisms have proliferated for invoking and enforcing legal rules, the
play in the joints previously provided by gaps in information and severe
limitations on the opportunities for appeal has likely diminished; rigid
formalism is harder to live with the more seriously and thoroughly it is
implemented.208 That may be why the new enthusiasm for pretextual
prosecutions is part of a broader shift toward a preference for ad hoc
instrumentalism in the exercise of government power. Regardless of
underlying cause, though, the broader shift seems clear.209 And prosecutors
are ad hoc instrumentalists par excellence.
Similarly, Anne O’Connell has pointed out the regulatory flexibility
provided by “boundary organizations”—government agencies straddling
the divides between public and private; between the federal government and
states, foreign nations, and Indian tribes; and between the legislative,
judicial, and executive branches.210
Her account strongly suggests
(although she does not explicitly claim) that the organizations she describes
have proliferated over the past century. Prosecutors’ offices muddy the
separation of executive from judicial power, so they fit snugly within
O’Connell’s definition of boundary organizations—maybe the only
category within which they fit snugly. But prosecutors also muddy other
Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 104 (2015); Janet Napolitano, The Truth About Dreamers, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2016, at A23.
207
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208
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“[y]ears ago academic students of the police . . . tried to clarify the nature of the order
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important divides, as I have tried to show. O’Connell focuses on agencies
that have “migrated” toward a boundary or were placed by Congress at a
boundary so that they could carry out their mission more effectively.211 For
prosecutors, though, we might say that boundary-crossing is the mission.
Ad hoc instrumentalism and boundary organizations, in turn, are parts
of a still larger movement toward greater flexibility and fluidity in
governance, a movement that includes the broad categories of negotiated
rulemaking,212 “unorthodox lawmaking,”213 and—most capacious of all—
“new governance.”214 Each of these developments has been celebrated as a
way to respond to greater legal complexity, and each does so in part by
evading or transcending traditional jurisprudential taxonomies. The
“blurring of boundaries pervades new governance,” for example, and has
been plausibly called one of its “signature strengths.”215 Again, however,
prosecutors go one better. New governance is increasingly faulted for
leaving no space for “adversarial legalism,”216 whereas the binaries bridged
by prosecutors, as we have seen, include the divide between adversarialism
and rival approaches to criminal justice.
III. REFORM
One reason why scholarship on prosecutors, at least in the United
States, has tended to be pragmatic and reformist is that American
prosecutorial agencies have long seemed, to most scholars, in urgent need
of reform. Since the mid-twentieth century if not earlier, “[t]he American
prosecutor has been under nearly constant attack in the criminal procedure
literature.”217 The core concern is that prosecutors have too much power
and too much discretion, that they are anomalies in a scheme of limited
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government, separation of powers, and rule of law. If prosecutors are first
and foremost mediating figures, though, if they have accumulated power
precisely because of their unrivalled ability to blur boundaries within
criminal justice, then reforming prosecutors’ offices is trickier business than
is often suggested, or at least a different kind of business. Many, if not
most, of the proposals for taming prosecutorial power aim to bring
prosecutors’ offices in line with other, more traditional government
agencies by clarifying and narrowing the prosecutor’s job: limiting the
prosecutor’s discretion,218 or making the prosecutor more clearly
adversarial219 or more explicitly inquisitorial,220 or having judges oversee
prosecutors the way judges oversee police officers,221 or making
prosecutors more like judges,222 or separating functions within a
prosecutors’ office.223 These are all efforts to stop prosecutors from blurring
boundaries so much. They may be sensible proposals, but they push against
a strong current. Prosecutors blur boundaries not because they have
grabbed power,224 and not because the ambiguity of their role has escaped
notice, but because boundary blurring has been what we have wanted
prosecutors to do—and, increasingly, what we want other officials to do as
well.
Whether we should want prosecutors to intermediate as much as they
do is a different question. Boundary blurring and the flexibility that it
facilitates have serious costs, and they can take a particular toll on
transparency and accountability. This is true of “unorthodox lawmaking”
and its analogs in the rulemaking context (including negotiated
rulemaking), which “bypass the hurdles of transparency” imposed by
traditional legislative and regulatory processes and can “obfuscate
accountability.”225 It is true of new governance: that is why discussions of
new governance spend so much time designing and assessing new forms of
accountability.226 It is plainly true of prosecutors, as well. Many if not most
218
219
220
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of the concerns raised about prosecutors pertain to the “accountability
deficit” under which they operate,227 and that deficit comes, in significant
part, from the mediating nature of the prosecutor’s role. But the connection
between accountability concerns and prosecutorial boundary-blurring has
not always been recognized.
In theory, American prosecutors operate under two separate forms of
oversight: as elected officials, they answer to the public, and as legal
officers, they are accountable to the law.228 Because prosecutors “straddle a
line that separates courts from politics,”229 they are subject to “a complex
set of constraints.”230 In practice, though, neither half of this set of
constraints seems to operate effectively. Prosecutors seem accountable
neither to the electorate nor to the legal system, in part exactly because of
the hybrid nature of their authority. The “locally elected status” of
American prosecutors gives legitimacy to their broad, virtually
unreviewable discretion,231 while the technical nature of their work helps to
make public assessments of their performance superficial and often
perfunctory: prosecutors who seek reelection are rarely unsuccessful.232 In a
similar way, prosecutors escape serious regulation through rules of
professional discipline, because prosecutors seem “fundamentally different
from . . . lawyers who represent clients,”233 and they escape close
supervision by the judiciary in part because they are advocates, not judges,
and “amenab[le] to professional discipline” by the bar.234
The American legal tradition has often sought to constrain power not
through “accountability,” either to the public or to the law, but instead
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through checks and balances, relying on “[a]mbition . . . to counteract
ambition.”235 But prosecutorial boundary-blurring seems to confound the
separation of powers, as well. Prosecutors exercise “both executive and
judicial power—posing the very danger the Framers tried to prevent.”236
Indeed, prosecutors do not just have authority both to “execute the law” and
to “adjudicate matters”; they also may be said to “legislate criminal law,
setting the penal code’s effective scope” through their collective exercise of
discretion.237
Faced with the difficulty of reconciling the realities of prosecutorial
power with the aspirations of a constitutional democracy, reformers
generally have pursued one of two paths—or, most often, some
combination of them. The first is to make prosecutors more responsive to
the public. The typical strategy for achieving this is either increased
transparency238 or, less commonly, some combination of decentralization
and community outreach.239 The second path is to make prosecutors more
accountable to law, either through outside oversight (to courts, bar
associations, or special disciplinary boards)240 or by strengthening of ruleof-law norms inside prosecutors’ offices.241 The first path tries to enhance
democratic control of prosecutors; the second is often (but not always)
motivated in part by a desire to insulate prosecutors from politics.
The two paths actually do not diverge very far. In fact, the three most
striking things about the reform programs that have been put forward over
the past half-century for addressing prosecutorial power are how similar
they have been to each other, how relatively modest they have been in their
ambitions, and how unsuccessful they have been in achieving even their
limited goals.
There has been a strong amount of consensus among scholars,
235
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Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 517 (2015) (describing
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stretching back to the 1970s, that prosecutors’ offices should be reformed in
the following ways: discretion should be constrained by internally
promulgated guidelines. Prosecutors should provide reasons for their
decisions. Defendants should have opportunities to be heard before those
decisions are made. And there should be meaningful mechanisms of
internal oversight and review. Four or five decades ago, the scholars
making these proposals generally hoped they would be adopted through
some combination of professionalism among prosecutors and prodding
from courts and legislatures242; today, scholars tend to place their hopes in
some combination of professionalism among prosecutors and prodding
from the community.243 That aside, the package of reform proposals has
stayed largely constant.244
It is a relatively mild package. Despite the fact that prosecutors’
offices as we now know them are relatively new institutions, dating back at
most to the late nineteenth century, there are no calls to abolish the
institution or to alter its core characteristics. Reformers uniformly stress
that they seek to impose only “decent” limitations on prosecutors245; they
have no quarrel with prosecutorial discretion, only with its “idiosyncratic”
use246; they do not want or expect rigid adherence to guidelines, just
“tolerable consistency.”247 Prosecutors’ offices will by and large be left
with all of their powers. They will just have to exercise those powers a
little more thoughtfully, a little less haphazardly, and with a little more
accountability.
Nonetheless, even this consensus package of minimal, prosecutorfriendly reforms has proven unattainable. One reason why the current
generation of scholars has soured on judicial oversight as a tool of
prosecutorial reform is that it never seemed to go anywhere. Controls over
242
See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
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243
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discretion). It runs contrary in some ways to “community prosecution,” which decentralizes
decision-making and downplays concerns about consistency. But community prosecution
has remained a marginal phenomenon, far more significant in campaign rhetoric than in
operations on the ground.
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prosecutors have not strengthened; “what has changed, if anything, is that
prosecutors now have even more power.”248 The use of guidelines is
“sporadic,” and “[m]ost prosecutor offices do not ask their attorneys to
record any reasons for their decisions.”249 Judicial review of charging
decisions and plea bargains remains virtually nonexistent. At the close of
the 1960s, Kenneth Culp Davis noted with bewilderment the
universally accepted assumptions . . . that the prosecuting power must of course be
discretionary, that statutory provisions as to what enforcement officers “shall” do may
be freely violated without disapproval from the public or from other officials, that
determinations to prosecute or not to prosecute may be made secretly without any
statement of findings or reasons, that such decisions by a top prosecutor of a city or
county or state usually need not be reviewable by any other administrative authority,
and that decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute are not judicially reviewable for
250
abuse of discretion.

He could not see any reason for these assumptions other than “unplanned
evolution” and a lack of critical reflection,251 but half a century on they
seem hardly shaken, at least among legislators and judges.
Hence the turn among scholars toward the possibility of democratic
oversight. The thought has been that although the United States lacks the
strong civil service tradition of Europe, maybe our own, distinctive political
traditions offer homegrown answers to the problem of prosecutorial power.
For us, perhaps, local election of prosecutors is a feature, not a bug. The
trick is simply to unleash the power of elections to prod prosecutors to selfregulate.252
It has long seemed apparent, though, that the “political check is not
working.”253 It seemed apparent to Kenneth Davis and others fifty years
ago–that is why they turned to courts and legislators.254 It has seemed
apparent to the scholars who have written more recently about prosecutors,
as well. Voters rarely turn prosecutors out of office, and campaign rhetoric
when prosecutors seek election or reelection tends to focus on personalities
rather than on policies.255 Part of the problem has seemed to be that the
public has little information about how well prosecutorial offices function,
248
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and the information it does have—such as conviction rates and crime
rates—provides a poor basis for assessing prosecutors’ performance. So
scholars, along with some reformers, have suggested that “transparency is
the key mechanism” for reining in prosecutors.256 With better information,
it is hoped, voters will pressure prosecutors’ offices to adopt guidelines and
procedures to ensure the principled and responsible exercise of
discretion.257
This idea has not gone anywhere, either. “Prosecutors on the whole
earn low grades for any kind of transparency,”258 and that appears to be
changing slowly if at all. Part of the reason may be the glaring difficulty
that scholars have had deciding what kind of information voters need about
prosecutors. The suggestions have ranged from crime and recidivism
rates,259 to the percentage of defendants who are convicted as charged,260 to
“regular performance evaluations of head prosecutors” by “[f]ellow
prosecutors, judges, defense counsel, defendants, victims, and jurors,”261 to
“the percent of defendants sentenced to incarceration, compared to last
year” (the lower, the better),262 to the “percent of violent (and serious) crime
cases on docket, compared to last year” (the higher, the better),263 to the
“costs the public bears for each case that was or could have been
prosecuted,” including “expenditures on prosecution, public defense, and
incarceration,”264 to measures of transparency itself, such as whether the
office publishes statistics on the cases it declines to prosecute.265 Unless
they are co-authors, no two scholars ever propose the same metric for
prosecutorial effectiveness. There is nothing remotely approaching a
consensus. And even if scholars could agree about what information
prosecutors’ offices should be disclosing, it is not clear the public would
care about it. The one statistic about prosecutors’ offices that generally is
256
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available to the public, conviction rates, is rarely emphasized in campaign
rhetoric266 and does not appear to influence a prosecutor’s chance of being
reelected.267 (Not that we should want it to.) Democratic oversight of
prosecutors has been stymied not just by a lack of transparency but, more
importantly, by uncertainty regarding what we should want prosecutors to
be transparent about.
One sign of how little has been accomplished through greater
transparency of prosecutorial decision-making is the difficulty that scholars
have had identifying success stories. The two scholars who have given the
most thought to transparency as a tool for reforming prosecutors’ offices,
Marc Miller and Ronald Wright, point to the models provided by Harry
Connick, the New Orleans District Attorney for the last quarter of the
twentieth century, and Russell Hauge, until recently the Prosecuting
Attorney for Kitsap County, Washington. Miller and Wright praise
Connick for his use of case processing data to manage the attorneys in his
office, and they praise Hauge’s office for publishing its policies and a range
of annual performance statistics, including the number of cases referred to
the office, the number of cases in which charges were reduced after the
initial filing, the number of diversions allowed, and the number of positions
eliminated for budgetary reasons.268 Miller and Wright wrote shortly before
a series of scandals, culminating in two decisions by the United States
Supreme Court, turned Connick’s office into “a national whipping boy for
violating defendants’ rights.”269 In Connick v. Thompson,270 the Court
narrowly overturned a $14 million award against Connick’s office for
failing to turn over exculpatory evidence271; four dissenters charged that
“[f]rom the top down . . . members of the District Attorney’s Office,
including the District Attorney himself . . . inadequately attended to their
disclosure obligations” and “slighted [their] responsibility to the profession

266
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and to the State’s system of justice.”272 The following year a nearly
unanimous Court took only three pages to find that discovery violations
required reversal of a murder conviction obtained by Connick’s office273;
“[d]uring oral argument, several justices verbally slapped” Connick’s
successor “for even bothering to defend” the verdict.274 Connick has
become, at best, an awkward model for prosecutorial accountability.
Hauge, for his part, was narrowly voted out of office in 2014.275 His
defeat did not reflect any Connick-style scandals, nor did it suggest that
Hauge’s efforts at transparency had backfired. His successor has said she
plans to continue Hague’s practice of publishing reports of the office’s
“goal, policies, direction and performance.”276 The practice is surely
laudable. But there is little indication that it has triggered any significant
changes in the office’s operations or deepened its engagement with the
public. The issues that led to Hague’s defeat appear to have had little or
nothing to do with the data he disclosed; instead, they seemed to have
centered on his support for gun control, his disputes with a local gun club,
his handling of a civil case involving a contract dispute between the county
and its deputy sheriffs—and the possibility that after twenty years of his
leadership, it simply was time for a change.277
Transparency has disappointed so far as a vehicle for reforming
prosecutors’ offices not just because it is difficult to decide on performance
metrics for public servants who blur so many boundaries, but also for two
other reasons, related as well to the intermediating nature of the
prosecutor’s job.
First, there is a constituency for keeping prosecutorial decision-making
in the shadows, and the constituency is not limited to prosecutors. Part of
the reason there has not been more pressure on prosecutors to document and
to disclose their exercises of discretion is that candor might make it harder
for prosecutors to carry out some of their work as intermediaries. There has
long been concern, for example, that if prosecutors made their charging
272
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criteria public, they would no longer be able to soften the edges of the law
without significantly undermining deterrence.278 There has also been
concern that if prosecutors had to disclose the reasons for decisions, they
could not be honest without antagonizing the courts,279 and they could not
be merciful without antagonizing the electorate.280 Similarly, there have
been persistent worries about publicly-announced charging criteria being
turned into “litigation weapons” or otherwise being used to force
prosecutors to defend departures from rigid uniformity;281 at bottom, these
are worries that prosecutors would be less free to blur the line between law
and discretion.
Second, and more fundamentally, much of what we want from
prosecutors is fairness, and that is a hard issue to debate in a political
campaign. This is why judicial elections are such a bad idea: judicial
virtues do not lend themselves to reinforcement through the ballot box.282
By the same token, because judicial virtues are some of what we want from
prosecutors, electoral oversight, even if greatly strengthened by improved
transparency, is an unpromising strategy for assessing and rewarding one
important aspect of a prosecutor’s performance.
Of course, other aspects of the prosecutor’s job do seem amenable to
electoral review.283 That is why electing prosecutors is easier to defend than
electing judges, and it is part of the reason judges are so reluctant to review
discretionary decisions by prosecutors. We want prosecutors “to strike the
appropriate balance between independence and accountability . . . to their
constituents”284; in other words, we want them to mediate between
democratic responsiveness and detached objectivity. This particular
mediating role of prosecutors is related to and helps facilitate some others,
such as the boundary-blurring function that Nicholas Parrillo describes
prosecutors performing in the nineteenth century: softening the edges of
“alien imposition” by mediating between positivist legislation and
community norms.285 It is partly prosecutors’ ambiguous relationship to
278
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local, democratic accountability that allows them to carry out the job that
Parrillo identifies. And that may help to explain why, as legal authority in
Europe gradually becomes more centralized and “alien imposition” from
Brussels becomes more pronounced,286 there are moves across the continent
to make prosecutors somewhat more responsive to local, popular
preferences.287 Increasingly, European prosecutors—like their American
counterparts—provide “a kind of suspension bridge between politics and
the judiciary.”288
CONCLUSION
It is precisely the bridges that prosecutors supply—between law and
politics, rules and discretion, courts and police, advocacy and objectivity—
that have made curtailing prosecutorial power and taming prosecutorial
discretion so much more difficult than reformers have often expected. The
intermediation performed by prosecutors makes them difficult to regulate.
As I have tried to demonstrate, though, the intermediation is not incidental
or accidental; it is what we have asked prosecutors to do. Therefore, if we
are serious about reforming the modern prosecutor’s office, or replacing it
with a different kind of institution, either we will need to find other ways to
blur the lines that prosecutors cross, or we will need to rethink our
commitment to making those boundaries so indistinct. And if we are
unconvinced that prosecutors need significant reform, if we are comfortable
with or even enthusiastic about the various forms of flexibility they provide,
it is worth understanding the sources of that flexibility, and reflecting on its
possible costs.
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